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Abstract
Consider users who share their data (e.g., location)
with an untrusted service provider to obtain a person-
alized (e.g., location-based) service. Data obfusca-
tion is a prevalent user-centric approach to protecting
users’ privacy in such systems: the untrusted entity
only receives a noisy version of user’s data. Perturb-
ing data before sharing it, however, comes at the price
of the users’ utility (service quality) experience which
is an inseparable design factor of obfuscation mecha-
nisms. The entanglement of the utility loss and the
privacy guarantee, in addition to the lack of a com-
prehensive notion of privacy, have led to the design
of obfuscation mechanisms that are either subopti-
mal in terms of their utility loss, or ignore the user’s
information leakage in the past, or are limited to very
specific notions of privacy which e.g., do not protect
against adaptive inference attacks or the adversary
with arbitrary background knowledge.
In this paper, we design user-centric obfuscation
mechanisms that impose the minimum utility loss for
guaranteeing user’s privacy. We optimize utility sub-
ject to a joint guarantee of differential privacy (in-
distinguishability) and distortion privacy (inference
error). This double shield of protection limits the
information leakage through obfuscation mechanism
as well as the posterior inference. We show that the
privacy achieved through joint differential-distortion
mechanisms against optimal attacks is as large as the
maximum privacy that can be achieved by either of
these mechanisms separately. Their utility cost is
also not larger than what either of the differential or
distortion mechanisms imposes. We model the opti-
mization problem as a leader-follower game between
the designer of obfuscation mechanism and the poten-
tial adversary, and design adaptive mechanisms that
anticipate and protect against optimal inference algo-
rithms. Thus, the obfuscation mechanism is optimal
against any inference algorithm.
1 Introduction
Data obfuscation is a mechanism for hiding private
data by using misleading, false, or ambiguous infor-
mation with the intention of confusing an adversary
[14]. A data obfuscation mechanism acts as a noisy
information channel between a user’s private data
(secret) and an untrusted observer [16]. The noisier
this channel is, the higher the privacy of the user will
be. We focus on user-centric mechanisms, in which
each user independently perturbs her secret before
releasing it. Note that we are not concerned with
database privacy, but with the privacy issues of re-
leasing a single sensitive data sample (which however
could be continuously shared over time). For exam-
ple, consider a mobile user who is concerned about
the information leakage through her location-based
queries. In this case, obfuscation is the process of
randomizing true locations so that the location-based
server only receives the user’s perturbed locations.
By using obfuscation mechanisms, the privacy of
a user and her utility experience are at odds with
each other, as the service that the user receives is a
function of what she shares with the service provider.
There are problems to be addressed here. One is how
to design an obfuscation mechanism that protects pri-
vacy of the user and imposes a minimum utility cost.
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Another problem is how to guarantee the user’s pri-
vacy, despite the lack of a single best metric for pri-
vacy.
Regarding utility optimization, we define utility
loss of obfuscation as the degradation of the user’s
service-quality expectation due to sharing the noisy
data instead of its true value. Regarding privacy pro-
tection, there are two major metrics proposed in the
literature. Differential privacy limits the information
leakage through observation. But, it does not reflect
the absolute privacy level of the user, i.e., what actu-
ally is learned about the user’s secret. So, user would
not know how close the adversary’s estimate will get
to her secret if she releases the noisy data, despite
being sure that the relative gain of observation for
adversary is bounded. Distortion privacy (inference
error) metric overcomes this issue and measures the
error of inferring user’s secret from the observation.
This requires assumption of a prior knowledge which
enables us to quantify absolute privacy, but is not ro-
bust to adversaries with arbitrary knowledge. Thus,
either of these metrics alone is incapable of capturing
privacy as a whole.
The problem of optimizing the tradeoff between
privacy and utility has already been discussed in the
literature, but notably for differential privacy in the
context of statistical databases [11, 25, 26, 28, 36].
Regarding user-centric obfuscation mechanisms, [52]
solves the problem of maximizing distortion privacy
under a constraint on utility loss. The authors con-
struct the optimal adaptive obfuscation mechanism
as the user’s best response to the adversary’s opti-
mal inference in a Bayesian zero-sum game. In the
same context, [9] solves the opposite problem, i.e., op-
timizing utility but for differential privacy. In both
papers, the authors construct the optimal solutions
using linear programming.
Differential and distortion metrics for privacy com-
plement each other. The former is sensitive to the
likelihood of observation given data. The latter is
sensitive to the joint probability of observation and
data. Thus, by guaranteeing both, we encompass
all the defense that is theoretically possible. In this
paper, we model and solve the optimal obfuscation
mechanism that: (i) minimizes utility loss, (ii) satis-
fies differential privacy, and (iii) guarantees distortion
privacy, given a public knowledge on prior leakage
about the secrets. We measure the involved metrics
based on separate distance functions defined on the
set of secrets. We model prior leakage as a probabil-
ity distribution over secrets, that can be estimated
from the user’s previously released data. Ignoring
such information leads to overestimating the user’s
privacy and thus designing a weak obfuscation mech-
anism (against adversaries who include such exposed
information in their inference attack).1
A protection mechanism for distortion privacy met-
ric can be designed such that it is optimal against
a particular inference algorithm (e.g., Bayesian in-
ference [7, 38] as privacy attacks [51, 54]). But, by
doing so, it is not guaranteed that the promised pri-
vacy level can be achieved in practice: an adversarial
observer can run inference attacks that are optimally
tailored against the very obfuscation mechanism used
by the user (regardless of the algorithm that the user
assumes a priori). In fact, the adversary has the up-
per hand as he infers the user’s secret (private infor-
mation) after observing the output of the obfuscation
mechanism. Thus, the obfuscation mechanisms must
anticipate the adaptive inference attack that will fol-
low the observation. This enables us to design an
obfuscation mechanism that is independent of the ad-
versary’s inference algorithm.
To address this concern, we adapt a game-theoretic
notion of privacy for designing optimal obfuscation
mechanisms against adaptive inference. We formu-
late this game as a Stackelberg game and solve it
using linear programming.2 We then add the differ-
ential privacy guarantee as a constraint in the linear
program and solve it to construct the optimal mech-
anism. The result of using such obfuscation mecha-
1Note that the prior leakage is not equivalent to the ad-
versary’s knowledge. An adversary might have access to some
information about the user’s data through channels where the
user is unaware of and has no control over. No protection
mechanism can guarantee the distortion privacy against ad-
versaries with arbitrary knowledge. Imagine the worst case
where adversary knows the exact secret but through channels
other than observation of the obfuscation mechanism. There-
fore, our focus is on the user, and we incorporate what the user
thinks has been leaked so far.
2As opposed to [52], the game is not zero-sum anymore
given that here user maximizes utility and observer minimizes
privacy.
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nism is that, not only the perturbed data samples are
indistinguishable from the true secret (due to differ-
ential privacy bound), but also they cannot be used
to accurately infer the secret using the prior leak-
age (due to distortion privacy measure). To the best
of our knowledge, this work is the first to construct
utility maximizing obfuscation mechanisms with such
formal privacy guarantees.
We illustrate the application of optimal protec-
tion mechanisms on a real data set of users’ loca-
tions, where users want to protect their location pri-
vacy against location-based services. We evaluate
the effects of privacy guarantees on utility cost. We
also analyze the robustness of our optimal obfusca-
tion mechanism against inference attacks with differ-
ent algorithms and background knowledge. We show
that our joint differential-distortion mechanisms are
robust against adversaries with optimal attack and
background knowledge. Moreover, the utility loss is
at most equal to the utility loss of differential or dis-
tortion privacy, separately.
The novelty of this paper in the context of user-
centric obfuscation is twofold:
• We construct optimal obfuscation mechanisms
that provably limit the user’s privacy risk (i.e.,
by guaranteeing the user’s distortion privacy)
against any inference attack, with minimum util-
ity cost.
• We design obfuscation mechanisms that opti-
mally balance the tradeoff between utility and
joint distortion-differential privacy. The solu-
tion is robust against adversary with arbitrary
knowledge, yet it guarantees a required privacy
given the user’s estimation of the prior informa-
tion leakage.
2 Related Work
This paper contributes to the broad area of re-
search that concerns designing obfuscation mecha-
nisms, e.g., in the context of quantitative information
flow [40, 34, 41], quantitative privacy in data shar-
ing systems [4, 52, 51], as well as differential privacy
[21, 26, 28, 36]. The conflict between privacy and util-
ity has been discussed in the literature [12, 31]. We
build upon prevalent notions of privacy and protect
it with respect to information leakage through both
observation (differential privacy) and posterior infer-
ence (distortion privacy) while optimizing the trade-
off between utility and privacy. We also formalize
this problem and solve it for user-centric obfuscation
mechanisms, where it’s each individual user who per-
turbs her secret data before sharing it with external
observers (e.g., service providers).
The problem of perturbing data for differential
and distortion privacy, separately, and optimizing
their effect on utility has already been discussed in
the literature. Original metric for differential pri-
vacy measures privacy of output perturbation meth-
ods in statistical databases [21]. Assuming two sta-
tistical databases to be neighbor if they differ only
in one entry, [25] and [26] design utility maximiz-
ing perturbation mechanisms for the case of counting
queries. In [28, 36], authors propose different ap-
proaches to designing perturbation mechanisms for
counting queries under differential privacy. However,
[11] presents some impossibility results of extending
these approaches to other types of database queries.
Under some assumptions about the utility metric,
[24] shows that the optimal perturbation probability
distribution has a symmetric staircase-shaped proba-
bility density function. [6, 15, 49] extend differential
privacy metric using generic distance functions on the
set of secrets. Some extensions of differential privacy
also consider the problem of incorporating the prior
knowledge into its privacy definition [32, 29].
The most related paper to our framework,
in this domain, is [9] where the authors con-
struct utility-maximizing differentially private ob-
fuscation mechanisms using linear programming.
The authors prove an interesting relation between
utility-maximizing differential privacy and distortion-
privacy-maximizing mechanisms that bound utility,
when distance functions used in utility and privacy
metrics are the same. This, however, cannot guaran-
tee distortion privacy for general metrics. The opti-
mal differentially private mechanisms, in general, do
not incorporate the available knowledge about the
secret while achieving differential privacy.
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Distortion privacy, which evaluates privacy as the
inference error [51], is a follow-up of information-
theoretic metrics for anonymity and information leak-
age [16, 20, 34, 50]. This class of metrics is concerned
with what can be inferred about the true secret of
the user by combining the observation (of obfuscated
information) and prior knowledge. The problem of
maximizing privacy under utility constraint, assum-
ing a prior, is proven to be equivalent to the user’s
best strategy in a zero-sum game against adaptive ad-
versaries [52]. With this approach, one can find the
optimal strategies using linear programming. In fact,
linear programming is the most efficient solution for
this problem [18]. However, if we want to guarantee
a certain level of privacy for the user and maximize
her utility, the problem cannot be modeled as a zero-
sum game anymore and there has been no solution
for it so far. We formalize this game, and construct a
linear programming solution for these privacy games
too.
Regarding the utility metric, we consider the ex-
pected distance between the observation and the se-
cret as the utility metric [11, 15, 25, 52]. The distance
function can depend on the user and also the appli-
cation.
In the case of applying obfuscation over time, we
need to update the user’s estimation of the prior
leakage according to what has been shared by the
user [53, 19]. We might also need to update the dif-
ferential privacy budget over time [17]. In this paper,
we model one time sharing of a secret, assuming that
the prior leakage and the differential privacy budget
are properly computed and adjusted based on the
previous observations.
Our problem is also related to the problem of ad-
versarial machine learning [5, 30] and the design of
security mechanisms, such as intelligent spam detec-
tion algorithms [37, 13, 35], against adaptive attack-
ers. It is also similar to the problem of placing se-
curity patrols in an area to minimize the threat of
attackers [48], and faking location-based queries to
protect against localization attack [52]. The survey
[39] explores more examples of the relation between
security and game theory.
3 Definitions
In this section, we define different parts of our model.
We assume a user shares her data through an infor-
mation sharing system in order to obtain some ser-
vice (utility). We also assume that users want to
protect their sensitive information, while they share
their data with untrusted entities. For example, in
the case of sharing location-tagged data with a ser-
vice provider, a user might want to hide the exact vis-
ited locations, their semantics, or her activities that
can be inferred from the visited locations. We refer
to the user’s sensitive information as her secret. To
protect her privacy, we assume that user obfuscates
her data before sharing or publishing it. Figure 1 il-
lustrates the information flow that we assume in this
paper.
The input to the protection mechanism is a secret
s ∈ S, where S is the set of all possible values that s
can take (for example, the locations that the user can
visit, or the individuals that she is acquainted with).
Let prior leakage pi be the probability distribution
over values of s to reflect the data model and the a
priori exposed information about the secret.
pi(s) = Pr{S = s} (1)
The probability distribution pi is estimated by the
suer to be the predictability of the user’s secret given
her exposed information in the past. Thus, anytime
that user shares some (obfuscated) information, she
needs to update this probability distribution [53, 19].
This is how we incorporate the correlation between
users’ data shared over time.
3.1 Obfuscation Mechanism
We assume that a user wants to preserve her pri-
vacy with respect to s. To protect her privacy, a
user obfuscates her secret s and shares an inaccurate
version of it through the system. We assume that
this obfuscated data o ∈ O is observable through the
system. We consider a generic class of obfuscation
mechanisms, in which the observable o is sampled
according to the following probability distribution.
p(o|s) = Pr{O = o|S = s} (2)
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Figure 1: The Information Sharing Framework.
Probability distribution pi encodes the user’s estima-
tion of a priori leaked information about secret s. The
secret is obfuscated by the protection mechanism p
whose output is an observable o. The adaptive ad-
versary (anticipated by the user) runs inference at-
tack q on o and draws a probability distribution over
estimates sˆ. Distance function c denotes the utility
cost of the protection mechanism due to obfuscation.
Distance function d denotes the privacy of user (for
distortion privacy metric) or the required indistin-
guishability between secrets (for differential privacy
metric). User defines the distance function d to re-
flect her privacy sensitivities.
Thus, we model the privacy preserving mechanism
as a noisy channel between the user and the untrusted
observer. This is similar to the model used in quanti-
tative information flow and quantitative side-channel
analysis [34, 41]. The output, i.e., the set of observ-
ables O, can in general be a member of the powerset
of S. As an example, in the most basic case, O = S,
i.e., the protection mechanism can only perturb the
secret by replacing it with another possible secret’s
value. This can happen through adding noise to s.
In a more generic case, the members of O can con-
tain a subset of secrets. For example, the protection
mechanism can generalize a location coordinate, by
reducing its granularity.
3.2 Utility Cost
Users incur a utility loss due to obfuscation. Let
the distance function c(o, s) determine the utility cost
(information usefulness degradation) due to replacing
a secret s with an observable o. The cost function is
dependent on the application of the shared informa-
tion, on the specific service that is provided to the
user, and also on the user’s expectations. We com-
pute the expected utility cost of a protection mecha-
nism p as ∑
s
pi(s)
∑
o
p(o|s) · c(o, s). (3)
We can also compute the worst (maximum) utility
cost over all possible secrets as
max
s
∑
o
p(o|s) · c(o, s). (4)
In this work, we do not plan to determine which
metrics are the best representative utility loss metrics
for different types of services or users. We only as-
sume that the designer of optimal obfuscation mech-
anism is provided with such a utility function, for
example, by constructing it according to the applica-
tion [43], or by learning it automatically [8] from the
users’ preferences and application profile.
3.3 Inference Attack
We stated that the user wants to protect her privacy
with respect to secret s against untrusted observers.
To be consistent with this, we define the adversary
as an entity who aims at finding the user’s secret by
observing the outcome of the protection mechanism
and minimizing the user’s privacy with respect to her
privacy sensitivities. For any observation o, then we
determine the probability distribution over the pos-
sible secrets sˆ ∈ S as to be the true secret of the
user.
q(sˆ|o) = Pr{S = sˆ|O = o} (5)
The goal of the inference algorithm q is to invert
a given protection mechanism p to estimate sˆ. The
error of adversary, in this estimation process, deter-
mines the effectiveness of the inference algorithm,
which is captured by the distortion privacy metric.
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3.4 Distortion Privacy Metric
As stated above, the user’s privacy and the adver-
sary’s inference error are two sides of the same coin.
We define the privacy gain of the user with secret s
as a distance between the two data points: d(sˆ, s),
where sˆ is the a posteriori estimation of the secret
[51]. The distance function d is determined by the
sensitivity of the user towards each secret s when es-
timated as sˆ. A user would be less worried about
revealing o ∼ p(o|s), if the portrait of her secret s in
the eyes of adversary is an estimate sˆ with a large
distance d(sˆ, s).
This distance function is defined by the user. It
could be a semantic distance between different val-
ues of secrets to reflect the privacy risk of sˆ on user
when her secret is s. Usually, the highest risk is as-
sociated with the case where the estimate sˆ is equal
to the secret s. However, sometimes even wrong esti-
mates can impose a high risk on the user, for example
when they leak information about the semantic of the
secret.
We compute the user privacy obtained through a
protection mechanism p, with respect to a given in-
ference algorithm q, for a specific secret s as∑
o
p(o|s)
∑
sˆ
q(sˆ|o) · d(sˆ, s). (6)
By averaging this value over all possible secrets, we
compute the expected distortion privacy of the user
as ∑
s
pi(s)
∑
o
p(o|s)
∑
sˆ
q(sˆ|o) · d(sˆ, s). (7)
This metric shows the average estimation error,
or how distorted the reconstructed user’s secret is.
Thus, we refer to it as the distortion privacy metric.
What associates a semantic meaning to this metric
is the distance function d. Many distance functions
can be defined to reflect distortion privacy. This de-
pends on the type of the secret and to the sensitiv-
ity of the user. For example, if the user’s secret is
her age, function d could be the absolute distance
between two numbers. If the secret is the user’s lo-
cation, function d could be a Euclidean distance be-
tween locations, or their semantic dissimilarity. If the
secret is the movies that she has watched, function
d could be the Jaccard distance between two sets of
movies.
3.5 Differential Privacy Metric
The privacy that is achieved by an obfuscation mech-
anism can be computed with respect to the informa-
tion leakage through the mechanism, regardless of the
secret’s inference. For example, the differential pri-
vacy metric, originally proposed for protecting pri-
vacy in statistical databases [21], is sensitive only to
the difference between the probabilities of obfuscat-
ing multiple secrets to the same observation (which
is input to the attack).
According to the original definition of differential
privacy, a randomized function K (that acts as the
privacy protection mechanism) provides -differential
privacy if for all data sets D and D′, that differ on
at most one element, and all Y ⊆ Range(K), the
following inequality holds.
Pr{K(D) ∈ Y } ≤ exp() · Pr{K(D′) ∈ Y } (8)
Differential privacy is not limited to statistical
databases. It has been used in many different con-
texts where various types of adjacency relations cap-
ture the context dependent privacy. A typical exam-
ple is edge privacy in graphs [46]. It has also been
proposed for arbitrary distance function between se-
crets [15].
This notion can simply be used for measuring in-
formation leakage [3]. It has been shown that differ-
ential privacy imposes a bound on information leak-
age [2, 1]. And, this is exactly why we are interested
in this metric. Let d(s, s′) be a distinguishability
metric between s, s′ ∈ S. A protection mechanism
is defined to be differentially private if for all secrets
s, s′ ∈ S, where d(s, s′) ≤ dm, and all observables
o ∈ O, the following inequality holds.
p(o|s) ≤ exp() · p(o|s′) (9)
In this paper, we use a generic definition of differ-
ential privacy, assuming arbitrary distance function
d() on the secrets [6, 15, 22, 49]. In this form, a pro-
tection mechanism is differentially private if for all
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secrets s, s′ ∈ S, with distinguishability d(s, s′), and
for all observables o ∈ O, the following holds.
p(o|s) ≤ exp( · d(s, s′)) · p(o|s′) (10)
In fact, the differential privacy metric guarantees
that, given the observation, there is not enough con-
vincing evidence to prefer one secret to other similar
ones (given d). In other words, it makes multiple
secret values indistinguishable from each other.
4 Problem Statement
The problem that we address in this paper is to find
an optimal balance between privacy and utility, and
to construct the protection mechanisms that achieve
such optimal points. More precisely, we want to
construct utility-maximizing obfuscation mechanisms
with joint differential-distortion privacy guarantees.
The problem is to find a probability distribution
function p∗ such that it minimizes utility cost of the
user, on average,
p∗ = argmin
p
∑
s
pi(s)
∑
o
p(o|s) · c(o, s) (11)
or, alternatively, over all the secrets
p∗ = argmin
p
max
s
∑
o
p(o|s) · c(o, s) (12)
under the user’s privacy constraints.
4.1 Distortion Privacy Constraint
Let dm be the minimum desired distortion privacy
level. The user’s average distortion privacy is guar-
anteed if the obfuscation mechanism p∗ satisfies the
following inequality.∑
s
pi(s)
∑
o
p∗(o|s)
∑
sˆ
q∗(sˆ|o) · d(sˆ, s) ≥ dm (13)
where q∗ is the optimal inference attack against p∗.
4.2 Differential Privacy Constraint
Let m be the differential privacy budget associated
with the minimum desired privacy of the user, and
dm be the distinguishability threshold. The user’s
privacy is guaranteed if p∗ satisfies the following in-
equality.
p∗(o|s) ≤ exp(m) · p∗(o|s′), ∀o, s, s′ : d(s, s′) ≤ dm
(14)
Or, alternatively (following [15]’s definition of dif-
ferential privacy):
p∗(o|s) ≤ exp(m · d(s, s′)) · p∗(o|s′), ∀s, s′, o (15)
In this paper, we mainly use the latter definition,
but make use of the former one as the basis to re-
duce the computation cost of optimizing differential
privacy (see Appendix C).
5 Solution: Privacy Games
The flow of information starts from the user where
the secret is generated. The user then selects a pro-
tection mechanism, and obfuscates her secret accord-
ing to its probabilistic function. After the adversary
observes the output, he can design an optimal in-
ference attack against the obfuscation mechanism to
invert it and estimate the secret. We assume the ob-
fuscation mechanism is not oblivious and is known
to the adversary. This gives the adversary the upper
hand against the user in their conflict. So, designing
an obfuscation mechanism against a fixed attack is
always suboptimal.
The best obfuscation mechanism is the one that
anticipates the adversary’s attack. Thus, the obfusca-
tion mechanism should be primarily designed against
an adaptive attack which is tailored to each specific
obfuscation mechanism. So, by assuming that the
adversary designs the best inference attack against
each protection mechanism, the user’s goal (as the
defender) must be to design the obfuscation mecha-
nism that maximizes her (privacy or utility) objective
against an adversary that optimizes the conflicting
objective of guessing the user’s secret. The adver-
sary is an entity assumed by the user as the entity
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whose objective s exactly the opposite of the user’s.
So, we do not model any particular attacker but the
one that minimizes user’s privacy according to dis-
tance functions d and d.
For each obfuscation mechanism there is an infer-
ence attack that optimizes the adversary’s objective
and leads to a certain privacy and utility payoff for
the user. The optimal obfuscation mechanism for the
user is the one that brings the maximum payoff for
her, against the mechanism’s corresponding optimal
inference attack.
Enumerating all pairs of user-attacker mechanisms
to find the optimal obfuscation function is infeasible.
We model the joint user-adversary optimization prob-
lem as a leader-follower (Stackelberg) game between
the user and the adversary. The user leads the game
by choosing the protection mechanism p, and the ad-
versary follows by designing the inference attack q.
The solution to this game is the pair of user-adversary
best response strategies p∗ and q∗ which are mutu-
ally optimal against each other. If the user imple-
ments p∗, we have already considered the strongest
attack q∗ against it. Thus, p∗ is robust against any
algorithm used as inference attack.
For any secret s ∈ S, the strategy space of the
user is the set of observables O. For any observ-
able o ∈ O, the strategy space of the adversary
is the set of secrets S (all possible adversary’s es-
timates sˆ ∈ S). For a given secret s ∈ S, we
represent a mixed strategy for the user by a vec-
tor p(.|s) = (p(o1|s), p(o2|s), · · · , p(om|s)), where
{o1, o2, · · · , om} = O. Similarly, a mixed strategy
for the adversary, for a given observable o ∈ O is a
vector q(.|o) = (q(sˆ1|o), q(sˆ2|o), · · · , q(sˆn|o)), where
{sˆ1, sˆ2, · · · , sˆn} = S. Note that the vectors p(.|s)
and q(.|o) are respectively the conditional distribu-
tion functions associated with an obfuscated function
for a secret s and an inference algorithm for an ob-
servable o. Let P and Q be the sets of all mixed
strategies of the user and the adversary, respectively.
P = {p(.|s) = (p(o1|s), p(o2|s), · · · , p(om|s)),∀s ∈ S :
p(oi|s) ≥ 0,∀oi ∈ O,
∑
i
p(oi|s) = 1} (16)
Q = {q(.|o) = (q(sˆ1|o), q(sˆ2|o), · · · , q(sˆn|o)),∀o ∈ O :
q(sˆj |o) ≥ 0,∀sˆj ∈ S,
∑
j
q(sˆj |o) = 1} (17)
A member vector of sets P or Q with a 1 for the
kth component and zeros elsewhere is the pure strat-
egy of choosing action k. For example, an obfusca-
tion function p(.|s) for which p(oi|s) = 0,∀i 6= k and
p(ok|s) = 1 is the pure strategy of exclusively and
deterministically outputting observable ok for secret
s. Thus, the set of pure strategies of a player is a
subset of mixed strategies of the player.
In the case of the distortion privacy metric, the
game needs to be formulated as a Bayesian Stackel-
berg game. In this game, we assume the probability
distribution pi on the secrets and we find p∗ ∈ P and
q∗ ∈ Q that create the equilibrium point. If user de-
viates from this strategy and chooses p′ 6= p∗, there
would be an inference attack q′∗ against it such that
(p′, q′∗) leads to a lower privacy for the user, i.e., p∗
is optimal.
In the case of a differential privacy metric, as the
metric is not dependent to the adversary’s inference
attack, the dependency loop between finding optimal
p∗ and q∗ is broken. Nevertheless, it is still the user
who plays first by choosing the optimal protection
mechanism. In the following sections, we solve these
games and provide solutions on how to design the
optimal user-adversary strategies.
6 Stackelberg Privacy Games
Assume that the nature draws secret s according
to the probability distribution pi(s). Given s, the
user draws o according to her obfuscation mecha-
nism p(o|s), and makes it observable to the adversary.
Given observation o, the adversary draws sˆ according
to his inference attack q(sˆ|o). We assume that pi(s)
is known to both players. We want to find the mu-
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tually optimal 〈p∗, q∗〉: The solution of the Bayesian
Stackelberg privacy game.
To this end, we first design the optimal inference
attack against any given protection mechanism p.
This will be the best response of the adversary to the
user’s strategy. Then, we design the optimal protec-
tion mechanism for the user according to her objec-
tive and constraints, as stated in Section 4. This will
be the user’s best utility-maximizing strategy that
anticipates the adversary’s best response.
6.1 Optimal Inference Attack
The adversary’s objective is to minimize (the user’s
privacy and thus) the inference error in estimating
the user’s secret. Given a secret s, the distance func-
tion d(sˆ, s) determines the error of an adversary in
estimating the secret as sˆ. In fact, this distance is ex-
actly what a user wants to maximize (or put a lower
bound on) according to the distortion privacy metric.
We compute the expected error of the adversary as∑
s
pi(s)
∑
sˆ
Pr{sˆ|s} · d(sˆ, s) =
=
∑
s,o,sˆ
pi(s) · p(o|s) · q(sˆ|o) · d(sˆ, s) (18)
Therefore, we design the following linear program,
through which we can compute the adversary’s infer-
ence strategy that, given the probability distribution
pi and obfuscation p, minimizes his expected error
with respect to a distance function d.
q∗ = argmin
q
∑
s,o,sˆ
pi(s) · p(o|s) · q(sˆ|o) · d(sˆ, s)
(19a)
under the constraint that the solution is a proper
conditional probability distribution function.
In the next subsection, we will show that the opti-
mal deterministic inference (that associates one single
estimate with probability one to each observation)
results in the same privacy for the user (33). Al-
ternative ways to formulate this problem is given in
Appendix A.
6.2 Optimal Protection Mechanism
In this case, we assume the user would like to mini-
mize her utility cost (11) under a (lower bound) con-
straint on her privacy (13). Therefore, we can formu-
late the problem as
p∗ = argmin
p
∑
s,o
pi(s) · p(o|s) · c(o, s) (20a)
s. t.
∑
s,o,sˆ
pi(s) · p(o|s) · q∗(sˆ|o) · d(sˆ, s) ≥ dm
(20b)
However, solving this optimization problem re-
quires us to know the optimal q∗ against p∗, for which
we need to know p∗ as formulated in (19). So, we have
two linear programs (one for the user and one for the
adversary) to solve. But, the solution of each one is
required in solving the other. This optimization de-
pendency loop reflects the game-theoretic concept of
mutual best response of the two players. This game is
a nonzero-sum Stackelberg game as the user (leader
player) and adversary (follower player) have different
optimization objectives (one maximizes utility, and
the other minimizes privacy). We break the depen-
dency loop between the optimization problems using
the game-theoretic modeling, and we prove that the
user’s best strategy can be constructed using linear
programming.
Theorem 1 Given a probability distribution pi, the
distance functions d and c, and the threshold dm, the
solution to the following linear program is the optimal
protection strategy p∗ for the user, which is the solu-
tion to (20) with respect to adversary’s best response
(19).
p∗ = argmin
p
∑
s,o
pi(s) · p(o|s) · c(o, s) (21a)
s. t.
∑
s
pi(s) · p(o|s) · d(sˆ, s) ≥ x(o),∀o, sˆ
(21b)∑
o
x(o) ≥ dm (21c)
Proof 1 See Appendix B.
9
7 Optimal Differential Privacy
In this section, we design optimal differentially pri-
vate protection mechanisms. We solve the optimiza-
tion problems for maximizing utility under privacy
constraint.
We design the following linear program to find the
user strategy p∗ that guarantees user differential pri-
vacy (15), for a maximum privacy budget m, and
minimizes the utility cost (11) of the obfuscation
mechanism.
min
p
∑
s,o
pi(s) · p(o|s) · c(o, s) (22a)
s. t.
p(o|s)
p(o|s′) ≤ ·exp(m · d
(s, s′)) ,∀s, s′, o (22b)
Or, alternatively, for a distinguishability bound
dm, we can solve the following.
min
p
∑
s,o
pi(s) · p(o|s) · c(o, s) (23a)
s. t.
p(o|s)
p(o|s′) ≤ exp(m) ,∀o, s, s
′ : d(s, s′) ≤ dm
(23b)
8 Optimal Joint Differen-
tial and Distortion Privacy
Mechanism
Obfuscation mechanisms designed based on distor-
tion and differential privacy protect the user’s privacy
from two different angles. In general, for arbitrary d
and d, there is no guarantee that a mechanism with
a bound on one metric holds a bound on the other.
Distortion privacy metric reflects the absolute pri-
vacy of the user, based on the posterior estimation on
the obfuscated information. Differential privacy met-
ric reflects the relative information leakage of each
observation about the secret. However, it is not a
measure on the extent to which the observer, who al-
ready has some knowledge about the secret from the
previously shared data, can guess the secret correctly.
So, the inference might be very accurate (because of
the background knowledge) despite the fact that the
obfuscation in place is a differentially-private mecha-
nism.
As distortion and differential metrics guarantee dif-
ferent dimensions of the user’s privacy requirements,
we respect both in a protection mechanism. This as-
sures that not only the information leakage is limited,
but also the absolute privacy level is at the minimum
required level. Thanks to our unified formulation
of privacy optimization problems as linear programs,
the problem of jointly optimizing and guaranteeing
privacy with both metrics can also be formulated as
a linear program.
The solution to the following linear program is a
protection mechanism p∗ that maximizes the user’s
utility and guarantees a minimum distortion privacy
dm and a minimum differential privacy m, given
probability distribution pi and distance functions c
and d and distinguishability metric d. The value of
the optimal solution is the utility cost of the optimal
mechanism.
min
p
∑
s,o
pi(s) · p(o|s) · c(o, s) (24a)
s. t.
∑
s
pi(s) · p(o|s) · d(sˆ, s) ≥ x(o),∀o, sˆ (24b)∑
o
x(o) ≥ dm (24c)
p(o|s)
p(o|s′) ≤ ·exp(m · d
(s, s′)) ,∀s, s′, o (24d)
9 Analysis
We have implemented all our linear program solu-
tions in a software tool that can be used to process
data for different applications, in different settings.
In this section, we use our tool to design privacy
protection mechanisms, and also to make a compar-
ison between different optimal mechanisms, i.e., dis-
tortion, differential, and joint distortion-differential
privacy preserving mechanisms. We study the prop-
erties of these mechanisms and we show how robust
they are with respect to inference attack algorithms
as well as to the adversary’s knowledge on secrets.
We also investigate their utility cost for protecting
privacy. Furthermore, we show that the optimal joint
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distortion-differential mechanisms are more robust
than the two mechanisms separately. In Appendix C,
we discuss and evaluate approximations of the opti-
mal solution for large number of constraints.
We run experiments on location data, as today
they are included in most of data sharing applica-
tions. We use a real data-set of location traces col-
lected through the Nokia Lausanne Data Collection
Campaign [33]. The location information belong to
a 15× 8km area. We split the area into 20× 15 cells.
We consider location of a mobile user in a cell as her
secret. Hence, the set of secrets is equivalent to the
set of location cells. We assume the set of observ-
ables to be the set of cells, so the users obfuscate
their location by perturbation (i.e., replacing their
true location with any location in the map). We run
our experiments on 10 randomly selected users, to
see the difference in the results due to difference in
user’s location distribution pi based on users’ differ-
ent location access profiles. We build pi for each user
separately given their individual location traces, us-
ing maximum likelihood estimation (normalizing the
user’s number of visits to each cell in the tarce).
We assume a Euclidean distance function for d and
d. This reflects the sensitivity of user towards her
location. By using this distance function for distor-
tion privacy, we guarantee that the adversary can-
not guess the user’s true location with error lower
than the required privacy threshold (dm). Choosing
Euclidean distance function as the metric for distin-
guishability ensures that the indistinguishability be-
tween locations is larger for locations that are located
closer to each other.
We assume a Hamming distortion function for c
(i.e., the utility cost is 0 only if the user’s location
and the observed location are the same, otherwise
the cost is 1). The utility metric can vary depending
on the location-based sharing application and also
the purpose for which the user shares her location
[8]. Choosing the Hamming function reflects the util-
ity requirement of users who want to inform others
about their current location in location check-in ap-
plications.
We evaluate utility-maximizing optimal protection
mechanisms with three different privacy constraints:
• Distortion Privacy Protection, (21).
• Differential Privacy Protection, (22).
• Joint Distortion-Differential Privacy Protection,
(24).
We compare the effectiveness of these protection
mechanisms against inference attacks by using the
distortion privacy metric (7). We consider two infer-
ence attacks:
• Optimal Attack, (19).
• Bayesian Inference Attack, using the Bayes rule:
q(sˆ|o) = pi(sˆ) · p(o|sˆ)
Pr{o} =
pi(sˆ) · p(o|sˆ)∑
s pi(s) · p(o|s)
(25)
9.1 Comparing Obfuscation Mecha-
nisms
Scenario 1. Our first goal is to have a fair compar-
ison between optimal distortion privacy mechanism
and optimal differential mechanism. To this end, we
set the privacy parameter m to {0.15, 0.3, · · · , 0.9}.
For each user and each value of m,
1. We compute the optimal differential privacy
mechanism using (22). Let p∗m be the optimal
mechanism.
2. We run optimal attack (19) on p∗m , and com-
pute the user’s absolute distortion privacy as
AP (p∗m).
3. We compute the optimal distortion privacy
mechanism p∗dm using (21). For this, we set the
privacy lower-bound dm to AP (p
∗
m). This en-
forces the distortion privacy mechanism to guar-
antee what the differential privacy mechanism
provides.
4. We compute the optimal joint distortion-
differential privacy mechanism p∗m,dm using
(24). We set the privacy lower-bounds to m and
dm for the differential and distortion constraints,
respectively.
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(a) Achieved distortion privacy for an optimal differential pri-
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(b) Utility cost metric versus distortion privacy metric, for
three different optimal obfuscation mechanisms
Figure 2: Privacy and Utility of optimal protection mechanisms, computed based on the evaluation scenario
number 1 in Section 9.1. Each dot in the plots corresponds to privacy of one user for one value of m.
5. We run optimal attack (19) on both p∗dm and
p∗m,dm , and compute the user’s absolute distor-
tion privacy as AP (p∗dm) and AP (p
∗
m,dm
), re-
spectively.
6. As a baseline for comparison, we run Bayesian
inference attack (25) on the three optimal mech-
anisms p∗m , p
∗
dm
, and p∗m,dm .
Figure 2 shows the results of our analysis, ex-
plained above. Distortion privacy is measured in km
and is equivalent to the expected error of adversary
in correctly estimating location of users. Figure 2(a)
shows how expected privacy of users AP (p∗m) de-
creases as we increase the value of the lower-bound
on differential privacy m. Users have different se-
cret probability distribution, with different random-
ness. However, as m increases, expected error of
adversary (the location privacy of users) converges
down to below 1km. Figure 2(b) plots the utility
cost versus distortion privacy of each optimal protec-
tion mechanism. As we have set the privacy bound
of the optimal distortion mechanism (and of course
the optimal joint mechanism) to the privacy achieved
by the optimal differential mechanism, we can make
a fair comparison between their utility costs. We ob-
serve that the utility cost for achieving some level of
distortion privacy is much higher for optimal differen-
tial and joint mechanisms compared with the optimal
distortion mechanism. Note that the utility cost of
differential and joint mechanisms are the same. So,
distortion privacy bound does not impose more cost
than what is already imposed by the differential pri-
vacy mechanism.
As we set dm to AP (p
∗
m), the user’s distortion pri-
vacy in using optimal distortion and optimal differen-
tial mechanism is the same, when we confront them
with the optimal attack (19). In Figure 3, however,
we compare the effectiveness of these two mechanisms
against Bayesian inference attack (25). It is inter-
esting to observe that the optimal differential mech-
anism is more robust to such attacks compared to
the optimal distortion mechanisms. This explains the
extra utility cost due to optimal differential mecha-
nisms.
In Figure 4, we compare the effectiveness of
Bayesian inference attack (25) and optimal attack
(19). We show the results for all three optimal pro-
tection mechanisms. It is clear that optimal attack
12
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Figure 3: Distortion privacy of users against the
Bayesian inference attack (25) when using optimal
differential privacy obfuscation versus using optimal
distortion privacy obfuscation. Each dot represents
privacy of one user for one value of m.
outperforms the Bayesian attack, as users have a rel-
atively higher privacy level under the Bayesian in-
ference. However, the difference is more obvious for
the case of differential protection and joint protec-
tion mechanisms. The Bayesian attack overestimates
users’ privacy, as it ignores the distance function d,
whereas the optimal attack minimizes the expected
value of d over all secrets and estimates.
Scenario 2. In this paper, we introduce the op-
timal joint distortion-differential protection mecha-
nisms to provide us with the benefits of both mech-
anisms. Figure 2(b) shows that the optimal joint
mechanism is not more costly than the two optimal
distortion and differential mechanisms. It also shows
that it guarantees the highest privacy for a certain
utility cost. To further study the effectiveness of op-
timal joint mechanisms, we run the following evalua-
tion scenario.
We design optimal differential mechanisms for
some values of m. And, we design optimal dis-
tortion mechanisms for some values of dm that are
higher than the distortion privacy resulted from those
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Figure 4: Distortion privacy of users using any of the
three optimal mechanisms against the basic Bayesian
inference attack (25) versus their privacy against the
optimal attack (19). Each dot represents privacy of
one user for one value of m.
differential privacy mechanisms. We also construct
their joint mechanisms given the m and dm param-
eters. Figure 5 shows how the optimal joint mecha-
nism adapts itself to guarantee the maximum of the
privacy levels guaranteed by optimal Bayesian and
optimal differential mechanisms individually. This is
clear from the fact that users’ privacy for the optimal
joint mechanism is equal to their privacy for distor-
tion mechanism (that as we set in our scenario, they
are higher than that of differential mechanisms).
Thus, by adding the distortion privacy constraints
in the design of optimal mechanisms, we can further
increase the privacy of users (with the same utility
cost) that cannot be otherwise achieved by only using
differential mechanisms.
Scenario 3. In order to further investigate the re-
lation between the privacy (and utility) outcome of
the optimal joint mechanism and that of individual
differential or distortion privacy mechanisms, we run
the following set of experiments on all the available
user profiles.
1. For any value of m in {0.2, 0.4, · · · , 1}, we com-
13
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
Privacy: Optimal Joint Protection
Pr
iv
ac
y:
 O
pt
im
al
 (D
iffe
ren
tia
l/D
ist
ort
ion
) P
rot
ec
tio
n
 
 
Differential
Distortion
Figure 5: Users’ privacy using optimal differential or
distortion protection mechanism versus using opti-
mal joint protection mechanism. Distortion privacy
is computed using optimal attack (19).
pute the utility of optimal differential privacy
mechanism as well as its privacy against optimal
attack.
2. For any value of dm in {0.5, 1, · · · , dmaxm }, we
compute the utility of optimal distortion privacy
mechanism as well as its privacy against optimal
attack. dmaxm is dependent on pi and is the max-
imum value that the threshold can take (beyond
which there is no solution to the optimization
problem).
3. For any value of m in {0.2, 0.4, · · · , 1}, and for
any value of dm in {0.5, 1, · · · , dmaxm }, we com-
pute the utility and privacy of the optimal joint
mechanism.
Figure 7 shows the results. By an experiment
we refer to the comparison of privacy (or utility) of
a joint mechanism (with bounds m, dm) with the
corresponding differential privacy mechanism (with
bound m) and the corresponding distortion privacy
mechanism (with bound dm). Note that here the
thresholds m and dm are chosen independently as
opposed to scenarios 1 (and also 2). We put the
results of all the experiments next to each other in
the x-axis. Therefore, any vertical cut on the Fig-
ure 7’s plots contain three points for privacy/utility
of p∗m,dm , p
∗
m , and p
∗
dm
. To better visualize the re-
sults, we have sorted all the experiments based on
the privacy/utility of the joint mechanism.
As the results show, the privacy achieved by
the optimal joint mechanism is equal to the max-
imum privacy that each of the individual differen-
tial/distortion mechanisms provides separately. This
means that the user would indeed benefit from includ-
ing a distortion privacy constraint based on her prior
leakage into the design criteria of the optimal obfus-
cation mechanism. This comes at no extra utility
cost for the user, as the utility graph shows. In fact,
the utility cost of an optimal joint mechanism is not
additive and instead is the maximum of the two com-
ponents, which is the differential privacy mechanism
in all tested experiments. The reason behind this
is that the differential privacy component makes the
joint obfuscation mechanism robust to the case where
the background knowledge of the adversary includes
not only the prior leakage but also other auxiliary
information available to him.
9.2 Evaluating the Effects of Prior
When using distortion metric in protecting privacy,
we achieve optimal privacy given the user’s estimated
prior leakage modeled by probability distribution pi
over the secrets. In the optimal attack against various
protection mechanisms, a real adversary makes use of
a prior distribution over the secrets. In this subsec-
tion, we evaluate to what extent a more informed ad-
versary can harm privacy of users further than what
is promised by the optimal protection mechanisms.
Note that no matter what protection mechanism is
used by the user, a more knowledgable adversary will
learn more about the secret. In this section, our
goal is not to show this obvious fact, but to evalu-
ate how robust our mechanisms are with respect to
adversaries with different knowledge accuracy levels.
To perform this analysis, we consider a scenario in
which the adversary’s assumption on pi, for each user,
has a lower level of uncertainty compared to pi. This
can happen in the real world when an adversary ob-
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Figure 7: The comparison between privacy and utility of optimal joint mechanism p∗m,dm with the indi-
vidual protection mechanisms p∗m and p
∗
dm
, i.e., the mechanisms whose bounds are jointly respected in the
optimal joint mechanism. The three points on each vertical line represent the results of one such comparison
experiment for different values of pairs of privacy thresholds (m, dm) in {0.2, 0.4, · · · , 1}×{0.5, 1, · · · , dmaxm }.
tains new evidence about a user’s secret that is not
used by user for computing pi. Let pˆi be the other ver-
sion of pi assumed by adversary, for a given user. For
the sake of our analysis, we generate pˆi by providing
the adversary with more evidence about most fre-
quently visited locations, e.g., home and work. This
is equivalent to the scenario in which the adversary
knows the user’s significant locations, e.g., where the
user lives and works. The entropy of pˆi is less than
that of pi, hence it contains more information about
the user’s mobility.
We construct the protection mechanisms assuming
pi, and we attack them by optimal inference attacks,
but assuming the lower entropy pˆi priors. Figure 6
illustrates privacy of users for different assumptions
of pˆi, using optimal differential protection versus op-
timal distortion protection (assuming pi). We ob-
serve that a more informed adversary has a lower
expected error. However, it further shows that an
optimal differential protection mechanism compared
to an optimal distortion mechanism is more robust
to knowledgable adversaries. Note that we set dm
to AP (p∗m), according to scenario 1 in Section 9.1.
So, when pˆi = pi, both optimal protection mecha-
nisms guarantee the same level of privacy. However,
as there is more information in pˆi than in pi, more in-
formation can be inferred from the optimal distortion
mechanism compared to the differential mechanism.
10 Conclusions
We have solved the problem of designing optimal
user-centric obfuscation mechanisms for data shar-
ing systems. We have proposed a novel methodol-
ogy for designing such mechanisms against any adap-
tive inference attack, while maximizing users’ utility.
We have proposed a generic framework for quanti-
tative privacy and utility, using which we formal-
ize the problems of maximizing users’ utility under
a lower-bound constraint on their privacy. The ma-
jor novelty of the paper is to solve these optimization
problems for both state-of-the-art distortion and dif-
ferential privacy metrics, for the generic case of any
distance function between the secrets. Being generic
with respect to the distance functions, enables us to
formalize any sensitivity function on any type of se-
crets. We have also proposed a new privacy notion,
joint distortion-differential privacy, and constructed
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Figure 6: Users’ privacy against the optimal attack
using optimal differential protection versus using op-
timal distortion protection. Each circle represents
privacy of a user for a different m and for a different
prior assumed in the attack. The red dots correspond
to the cases where the probability pi assumed in de-
signing the protection mechanism is the same as the
attacker’s knowledge.
its optimal mechanism that has the strengths of both
metrics. We have provided linear program solutions
for our optimization problems that provably achieve
minimum utility loss under those privacy bounds.
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A Optimal Inference Attacks
Given the user’s protection mechanism p∗, the infer-
ence attack (19) is a valid strategy for the adversary,
as there is no dependency between the defender and
attacker strategies in the case of differential privacy
metric.
However, as the differential privacy metric (used
in the protection mechanism) does not include any
probability distribution on secrets, we can design an
inference attack whose objective is to minimize the
conditional expected error Es:
Es =
∑
o,sˆ
p∗(o|s) · q(sˆ|o) · d(sˆ, s) (26)
for all secrets s. This is a multi-objective optimiza-
tion problem [42] that does not prefer any of the Es
(for any secret) to another. Under no such pref-
erences, the objective is to minimize
∑
sEs, using
weighted sum method with equal weight for each se-
cret.
Thus, the following linear program constitutes the
optimal inference attack, under the mentioned as-
sumptions.
min
q
∑
s,o,sˆ
p∗(o|s) · q(sˆ|o) · d(sˆ, s) (27)
As all the wights of Es are positive (= 1), the min-
imum of (27) is Pareto optimal [55]. Thus, mini-
mizing (27) is sufficient for Pareto optimality. The
optimal point in a multi-objective optimization (as
in our case) is Pareto optimal “if there is no other
point that improves at least one objective function
without detriment to another function” [42, 47].
An alternative approach is to use the min-max for-
mulation, and minimize the maximum conditional ex-
pected error Es over all secrets s. For this, we intro-
duce a new unknown parameter y (that will be the
maximum Es). The following linear program solves
the optimal inference attack using the min-max for-
mulation. This also provides a necessary condition
for the Pareto optimality [44].
min
q
y (28a)
s. t.
∑
o,sˆ
p∗(o|s) · q(sˆ|o) · d(sˆ, s) ≤ y , ∀s (28b)
We can also consider the expected error condi-
tioned on both secret s and estimate sˆ as the ad-
versary’s objective to minimize. So, we can use
Esˆ,s = Pr{sˆ|s} · d(sˆ, s) instead of
∑
sˆ Pr{sˆ|s} · d(sˆ, s)
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in (26), and use the same approach as in (28). The
following linear program finds the optimal inference
attack that minimizes the conditional expected es-
timation error over all s and sˆ, using the min-max
formulation.
min
q
y (29a)
s. t.
∑
o
p∗(o|s) · q(sˆ|o) · d(sˆ, s) ≤ y , ∀s, sˆ (29b)
Overall, we prefer the linear program (27) as it
has the least number of constraints among the above
three. We can also use (19) for comparison of opti-
mal protection mechanisms based on distortion and
differential metrics.
B Proof of Theorem 1
We construct (21) from (20). In (20), we condition
the optimal obfuscation p∗ on its corresponding opti-
mal inference (best response) attack q∗. So, for any
observable o, the inference strategy q∗(.|o) is the one
that, by definition of the best response, minimizes
the expected error∑
sˆ
q(sˆ|o)
∑
s
pi(s) · p(o|s) · d(sˆ, s) (30)
Thus, the privacy value (20b) to be guaranteed is∑
s,o,sˆ
pi(s) · p(o|s) · q∗(sˆ|o) · d(sˆ, s) =
=
∑
o
min
q(.|o)
∑
sˆ
q(sˆ|o)
∑
s
pi(s) · p(o|s) · d(sˆ, s) (31)
Note that (30) is an average of
∑
s pi(s) · p(o|s) ·
d(sˆ, s) over sˆ, and thus it must be larger or equal to
the smallest value of it for a particular sˆ.
min
q(.|o)
∑
sˆ
q(sˆ|o)
∑
s
pi(s) · p(o|s) · d(sˆ, s)
≥min
sˆ
∑
s
pi(s) · p(o|s) · d(sˆ, s) (32)
Let q′(.|o) be a conditional probability distribution
function such that for any given observable o,
q′(s′|o) =
{
1 if s′ = argmin
sˆ
∑
s pi(s) · p(o|s) · d(sˆ, s)
0 otherwise
(33)
Note that q′ ∈ Q is a pure strategy that represents
one particular inference attack. Moreover, (31) con-
structs q∗ such that it optimizes (30) over the set of
all mixed strategies Q that include all the pure strate-
gies. The minimum value for the optimization over
the set of all mixed strategies is clearly less than or
equal to the minimum value for the optimization over
its subset (the pure strategies). Thus, the following
inequality holds.∑
sˆ
q∗(sˆ|o)
∑
s
pi(s) · p(o|s) · d(sˆ, s)
= min
q(.|o)
∑
sˆ
q(sˆ|o)
∑
s
pi(s) · p(o|s) · d(sˆ, s)
≤
∑
sˆ
q′(sˆ|o)
∑
s
pi(s) · p(o|s) · d(sˆ, s)
= min
sˆ
∑
s
pi(s) · p(o|s) · d(sˆ, s) (34)
Therefore, from inequalities (32) and (34) we have∑
s,o,sˆ
pi(s) · p(o|s) · q∗(sˆ|o) · d(sˆ, s)
=
∑
o
min
sˆ
∑
s
pi(s) · p(o|s) · d(sˆ, s) =
∑
o
x(o)
(35)
where x(o) = min
sˆ
∑
s pi(s) · p(o|s) · d(sˆ, s), or equiv-
alently x(o) ≤∑s pi(s) · p(o|s) · d(sˆ, s),∀sˆ.
Thus, the constraint (20b) in the linear program
(20) is equivalent to (and can be replaced by) the con-
straints (21b) and (21c) in the linear program (21).
C Approximating The Optimal
Mechanisms
Here, we briefly discuss the computational aspects
of the design of optimal protection mechanisms. Al-
though the solution to linear programs provides us
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Figure 8: Error (in km) and computation time (in sec) of approximate optimal joint distortion-differential
privacy protection mechanisms, by considering a subset of optimization constraints. We consider only the
constraints for which the distance d() (in km) between observation and secret and the distance between two
secrets is less than the x-axis. In the left-hand side figure, the y-axis shows the distribution of the difference
between privacy of users with and without approximation. In the right-hand side figure, the y-axis represents
the total computation time of solving the linear program of the approximate optimal joint mechanism in
Matlab on a machine with 4 core CPU model Intel(R) Xeon(R) 2.40GHz. The central mark in each box
shows the median value, computed over all users. The boxplot also shows the 25th, and 75th percentiles as
well as the outliers.
with the optimal protection mechanism, their compu-
tation cost is quadratic (for distortion mechanisms)
and cubic (for differential mechanisms) in the cardi-
nality of the set of secrets and observables. Providing
privacy for a large set of secrets needs a high compu-
tation budget. To establish a balance between the
computation budget and privacy requirements, we
can make use of approximation techniques to design
optimal protection mechanisms. We explore some
possible approaches.
Linear programming [10] is one of the fundamen-
tal areas of mathematics and computer science, and
there is a variety of algorithms to solve a linear pro-
gram. Surveying those algorithms and evaluating
their efficiencies is out of the scope of this paper.
These algorithms search the set of feasible solutions
of a problem for finding the optimal solution that
meets the constraints. Many of these algorithms are
iterative and they converge to the optimal solution
as the number of iterations increases [45, 27]. Thus,
a simple approximation method is to stop the itera-
tive algorithm when our computation budget is over.
Other approximation methods exist. For example,
[23] suggests a sampling algorithm to select a subset
of constraints in an optimization problem to speed
up the computation. Moreover, we can rely on the
particular structure of secrets to reduce the set of
constraints [9].
We can implement those approximation techniques
to solve approximately optimal protection mecha-
nisms in an affordable time. Furthermore, we can
rely on the definition of privacy to find the constraints
that have a minor contribution to the design of the
protection mechanism. In this section, we study one
approximation method, following the intuition be-
hind the differential privacy bound: we remove the
constraints for which the distance d(s, s′) is larger
than a threshold. We can justify this by observing
that, in the definition of differential privacy metric
(10), the privacy is more protected when for secrets
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s, s′, the distance d(s, s′) is small. To put this in per-
spective, note that if we use the original definition of
differential privacy, there would not be any constraint
if d(s, s′) > 1. We also apply this approximation to
the distance between observables and secrets.
In Figure 8, we show the privacy loss of users as
well as the speed-up of their computation due to ap-
proximation. We performed the computation on a
machine with 4 core CPU model Intel(R) Xeon(R)
2.40GHz. As we increase the approximation thresh-
old (which is the distance beyond it we ignore the
constraints), the approximation error goes to zero.
This suggests that, for a large set of secrets, if we
choose a relatively small threshold the approximated
protection mechanism provides almost the same pri-
vacy level as in the optimal solution. The compu-
tation time, however, increases as the approximation
error decreases (due to increasing the approximation
threshold). Figure 8 captures such a tradeoff of our
approximation method.
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